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of agency aims, urge that it is most desirable that the courts continue to
scrutinize closely the records of administrative actions where rules have been
ignored, for hiding behind a "mere" procedural error may be a substantial
injustice. In rebuttal, from the agencies' view, it is admitted that the judiciary
has done much to discourage the ignoring of regulations and customs. While
this is not necessarily to be faulted, the nature of the administrator's duties
and the vast volume and complexity of the business which he faces require
that he retain some discretion if substantial justice is to be done. The estab-
lishment of all-embracing and uniformly applicable regulations will not insure
this. The real question should always be , whether or not due process has been
done. It is submitted that in the future an appellant should not be allowed
to avail himself of even the most flagrant disregard of procedural rules unless
he can also show that the procedural error caused him injustice."
GERALD E. FARRELL
Antitrust—Antitrust Civil Process Act—Investigation of Premerger
Activities.—United States v. Union Oil Co.'—Union Oil Co. filed d'petition
to set aside a Civil Investigative Demand issued by the Department of Justice
pursuant to the Antitrust Civil Process Act (ACPA). 2 The demand requested
documents relating to an investigation of "proposed acquisitions of fertilizer
companies by petroleum companies" for the purpose of "ascertaining whether
there is or has been a violation of" 3 Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 4 The dis-
83 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. I, rehearing denied, 304 U.S. 23 (1938); see
Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926), where Mr. Justice Stone, speaking
of due process, said:
Its requirements are satisfied if he has reasonable notice, and reasonable oppor-
tunity to be heard and to present his claim or defence, due regard being had
to the nature of the proceedings and the character of the rights which may be
affected by it.
Id. at 42.
1 343 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1965).
2 76 Stat. 548 (1962), 15 U.S.C. § 1311-14 (1964).
3 Part of the demand was reproduced in a footnote in the opinion, the relevant
portions of which are set forth herein:
You are hereby required to produce . . . the documentary material in your
possession, custody or control described on the attached schedule ... .
This civil investigative demand is issued pursuant to the provisions of the
Antitrust Civil Process Act .. . in the course of an inquiry for the purpose of
ascertaining whether there is or has been a violation of the provisions of Title 15
United States Code Sec. 18 [Clayton Act, Section 71 by conduct of the following
nature: The proposed acquisitions of fertilizer companies by petroleum com-
panies.
Attached was a schedule of documents:
1. Each survey, study, report or other writing prepared or used by the
corporation, its officers,' directors or employees, which refers or relates to the
maintenance or improvement of the corporation's position in the fertilizer market,
including each such document relating to any acquisition, merger, sale of assets,
or consolidation consummated or considered by the corporation.
Supra note 1, at 30 n.l.
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trict court granted Union's petition on the ground that the ACPA may not
be used to investigate prospective acquisitions which, if consummated, might
violate section 7.5
 On appeal by the Department of Justice, the Ninth Circuit
HELD: The ACPA may not be used to investigate proposed acquisitions since
such acquisitions are not "violations" of the antitrust laws within the mean-
ing of the ACPA.
In construing the statute, the court refused to go beyond its literal word-
ing. Section 3(a) of the ACPA° authorizes the Attorney General to serve a
demand upon "any person under investigation" who may be in control of
documentary material relevant to a civil antitrust investigation. "Antitrust
investigation" is defined in section 2 (c) 7 as "any inquiry conducted . . ..for
athe purpose of ascertaining whether any person is or has been engaged in ny
antitrust violation." Section 2 (d) 8
 defines "antitrust violation" as "any act
or omission in violation of any antitrust law or any antitrust order." Stating
that Section 7 of the Clayton Act cannot be violated until there has been a
consummated acquisition, the court held, therefore, that a proposed acquisi-
tion could not be a "violation" of that section. Thus, since the ACPA is
limited to use where there "is or has been" a violation of the antitrust Jaws, it
cannot be employed to aid in investigating conduct which may at some future
time become a "violation."
The Government's chief contention was that "antitrust violation" should
not be limited merely to describe conduct made unlawful by the substantive
antitrust law but should be interpreted to include "any conduct for which the
United States could bring an action and obtain relief under any antitrust law."°
The Government argued that the former interpretation of "violation" results
in an artificial distinction between the power to investigate pursuant to a
possible action to enjoin a violation of section 7 (under section 15 10 ) and the
power to investigate pursuant to a possible action to divest (under section
11 11 ). The court, however, felt that this distinction was clearly intended by
the statute, reasoning that a proposed acquisition could not be made a
"violation" of the Clayton Act merely because it was enjoinable under
section 15. The court also made light of the further contention of the Gov-
ernment that the ACPA was intended to be used as a tool to prevent unlawful
mergers in conjunction with proposed legislation which would require notice
before a merger could be consummated, adding that nothing in the legislative
history of the ACPA indicated such a connection.
On the facts before it, the court probably had no other choice but to set
aside the demand. Although the Justice Department was investigating three
other oil companies which were contemplating the acquisition of fertilizer
companies,12
 the Government did not allege that Union was in any way con-
4
 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
6
 Petition of Union Oil Co.,.225 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
6
 76 Stat. 548 (1962), 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1964).
7
 76 Stat."548 (1962), 15 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1964).
8
 76 Stat, 548 (1962), 15 U.S.C. § 1311(d) (1964).
Brief for Appellant, p. 20, supra note 1.
78
 38 Stat. 736 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 25'(1964).
11
 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964).
12
 Brief for Appellee, p. 16, supra note 1.
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nected with any of these transactions or that it had any information relevant
thereto, nor did it allege that Union was in the process of making such acquisi-
tions or even considering such a move.18 Thus, it is difficult to perceive how
Union could properly be considered a "person under investigation,"—a vital
prerequisite for the issuance of a demand under! the ACPA. Hence, there was
apparently no justification for the Justice Department to look through Union's
records. However, perhaps out of concern that if the Government's arguments
were accepted the Attorney General might be able to conduct fishing expedi-
tions,14 the court went on to formulate the broad rule that the ACPA does
not authorize the use of the civil investigative, process to inquire into any
proposed acquisition. In so doing, the court certainly went much further than
required and unnecessarily set a precedent which seriously impedes the
ACPA's intended usefulness. .
Had the court wished, they might have found in the language of the
ACPA a basis for the Government's argument that the ACPA applies to all of
the antitrust laws, including procedural provisions such as section 15. Accord-
ing to Section 2 (a) of the ACPA,15 "antitrust law" includes:
(1) Each provision of law defined as one of the antitrust laws
. [by Section 1 of the Clayton Act"] ;
(2) The Federal Trade Commission Act; and
(3) Any statute enacted [after this act] . . . which prohibits,
or makes available to the United States in any court of the United
States any civil remedy with respect to ... [unfair trade practices or
monopolization of commerce]. (Emphasis added.)
in addition, "antitrust order" is defined by section 2(b)' 7 as "any final order,
decree, or judgment of any court of the United States, duly entered in any case
or proceeding arising under any antitrust law." Taking these definitions, in
13 See note 3 supra. It is difficult to imagine why the Government decided to appeal
this case. If it were seeking a test case in order to define the limits of its powers under the
ACPA, the choice of this investigative demand upon Union as the vehicle to accomplish
such a purpose appears to have been a poor one. It does not seem that the Attorney
General had any legitimate reason to look at Union's records; the requirement that the
demandee be a "person under investigation" negates the possibility that the ACPA could
be used by the Justice Department to make an industry-wide survey, even if several
companies in the particular industry happen to be violating the laws. This is not to say
that a corporation must be suspected of a violation before it can be investigated. It
need only have information relevant to a possible violation in order to qualify as a
person under investigation. See 108 Cong. Rec. 18407 (1962) (report of the joint confer-
ence to resolve differences between the two versions of the bill) ; 108 Cong. Rec. 13995
(1962) (remarks of Congressman Smith); 108 Cong. Rec. 4005 (1962) (remarks of,
Congressman Celler).
Altough the decision in Petition of Gold Bond Stamp Co., 221 F. Supp. 391, 396
(D. Minn. 1963), aff'd, Gold Bond Stamp Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir.
1964), indicated that the ACPA now allows the Justice Department to engage in such
piscatory excursions, it is doubtful that Congress so intended. See, e.g., 108 Cong. Rec.
18408 (1962) (remarks of Congressman MacGregor).
13 76 Stat. 548 (1962), 15 U.S.C. 1311(a) (1964).
le Section 1 includes the Clayton Act within its definition of "antitrust laws." 38
Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
17 76 Stat. 548 (1962), 15 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1964).
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addition to those previously cited, it could be argued that the ACPA was
intended to apply to each and every provision of the antitrust laws and to
allow an investigation prior to proceeding under any provision thereof, as
the Government contended. Even though section 2(d) defines "antitrust
violation" as a "violation of any antitrust law," and there may be some
conceptual difficulty in "violating" a procedural provision such as Section 15
of the Clayton Act which merely provides a civil remedy to prevent violations
of the act, still, section 15 does indicate what practices may give rise to an
injunctive proceeding and thus does set out some substantive standards that
could be "violated."
The legislative history of the ACPA further supports the Government's
position. That history reveals that several premerger notification bills were
pending in Congress' 8
 along with the ACPA, which would amend Section 7
of the Clayton Act to provide for notice to the Department of justice before
a merger could be consummated.i° However, of what use would be such
notification if there were no method of investigating proposed mergers before
they became consummated? In his remarks introducing premerger notification
legislation in the Senate, 2° Senator Kefauver stated that he felt the bill was
a necessary adjunct to the ACPA and that the bills effectively supplemented
each other. Congressman Celler, sponsor of the ACPA in the House of Repre-
sentatives, noted that the ACPA was "particularly needed in the case of
contemplated mergers." (Emphasis added.)
[T]his bill [the ACPA] would permit the Department [of Justice]
to obtain relevant evidence prior to the merger, so it could go into
court and get a temporary injunction restraining a proposed merger
in advance . . . . So the adoption of this bill may render premerger
notification unnecessary.2' (Emphasis added.)
Thus, there appears to have been a clear intent by the Legislature to give
the Justice Department the power to investigate proposed mergers; the pre-
merger bill was merely to provide the Department with the additional ad-
vantage of official notification of pending mergers in case it did not otherwise
know of them. The court, however, decided that, because of the brevity of the
18
 107 Cong. Rec. 142 (1961) (introduced by Senator Kefauver); 107 Cong. Rec.
990, 1455, 5297, 6910 (1961) (four bills introduced in the House by various Congressmen).
19
 The bills generally provided for a 60-day notice. Supra note 1, at 36.
20 107 Cong. Rec. 188 (1961), (remarks of Senator Kefauver).
21
 A more complete quotation follows:
The bill is . . . particularly needed in the case of contemplated mergers . . . .
This would give the Department the power to get the information and the docu-
mentary evidence so that if a merger that is contemplated is unlawful, such
mergers can be prevented before they are consummated . . . . I am inclined to
believe if we pass this bill, we need not have any need to pass the Premerger
Notification Act. . . .
.. . . The Department of Justice has stated that it generally has advance
information regarding significant mergers, and this bill would permit the Depart-
ment to obtain relevant evidence prior to the merger, so it could go into court
and get a temporary injunction restraining a proposed merger in advance ... .
So the adoption of this bill may render premerger notification unnecessary.
108 Cong. Rec. 3998 (1962) (remarks of Congressman Celle*
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notification period, such legislation really did not facilitate investigation of
proposed mergers and that its resulting function was the same as the ACPA
in providing the Justice Department with information which would enable it
to "bring a suit to undo a freshly consummated merger before the 'scrambling'
was such that divestiture was inappropriate." 22
It appears that the court thus misconstrued the implications of the
intended cooperation between the premerger legislation and the ACPA. The
effect of the holding is to leave the Department of Justice, at least in respect
to investigations of proposed mergers and acquisitions, back where it started
before its seven-year struggle to have the ACPA enacted into law. Before the
ACPA there were only four possible methods available for obtaining the
information upon which the Department depended to enforce the antitrust
laws,28 all of which were recognized by Congress as clearly inadequate for
civil proceedings?' A further review of the legislative history indicates little
opposition to giving the Attorney General the investigatory power he desired,
the only real debate centering around the safeguards to be included in the
statute to protect potential demandees under the act.25
The result of this case would be less serious if there were some existing
machinery to fill the investigative void created. However, the only other
federal agency with sweeping enforcement powers over mergers is the FTC,'
and, however broad its powers may be, the FTC is limited to obtaining docu-
mentary material from corporations being "investigated or proceeded
against,"27 and it only has power to issue cease and desist orders. 25
 There is no
provision whereby it could obtain preliminary injunctions from a court 2°
comparable to the power of the Attorney General to do so under Section 15
of the Clayton Act. Thus, it appears that the Justice Department must resort
to its old methods of obtaining information upon which to base a section 15
22 Supra note 1, at 36.
23 The four methods are as follows: (1) Voluntary cooperation, which has not been
wholly satisfactory; (2) grand jury with its subpoena powers, but this may be used
only if criminal action is contemplated; (3) requesting the Federal Trade Commission
to conduct the investigation, which has never been tried and is considered unworkable;
(4) filing a civil complaint and using the discovery procedures of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which is frowned upon by the courts and is not a proper method of
investigation. 105 Cong. Rec. 14608 (1959) (remarks of Senator Kefauver).
24 See, e.g., 107 Cong. Rec. 189 (1961) (remarks of Senator Kefauver); 105 Cong.
Rec. 14608 (1959) (remarks of Senator Kefauver).
25 See, e.g., 108 Cong. Rec. 13994 (1962) (remarks of Congressman Patman); 108
Cong. Rec. 4004 (1962) (remarks of Congressman MacGregor); 105 Cong. Rec. 14609
(1959) (remarks of Senator Kefauver).
26 73 Stat. 243 (1959), 1.5 U.S.C. § 21 (1964).
27
 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1964). That one need not be suspected of a
violation in order to be under investigation in connection with a suspected violation by
another business, see FTC v. Harrell, 313 F.2d 854, 856 (7th Cir. 1963); FTC v. Bowman,
149 F. Supp. 624, 627 (ND. Ill. 1957). As to a similar meaning intended for the ACPA,
see note 13 supra.
28
 52 Stat. 111 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
29
 Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 286 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 877 (1961), (FTC may make a precomplaint investigation only where there is or has
been a violation); FTC v. International Paper Co., 241 F.2d 372, 373 (2d Cir. 1956)
(FTC has no power to obtain a preliminary injunction).
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proceeding, and the FTC must wait for a consummated acquisition before it
can issue a cease and desist order.
This decision, therefore, has created a serious void which should quickly
be filled. Some agency must have the responsibility and the power to prevent
mergers which will violate the antitrust laws if consummated, especially in
view of the economic damage and the often near impossibility of unscrambling
companies which have been merged for a subgtantial period of time. It would
appear that an amendment to the ACPA which would allow the Justice De-
partment to investigate proposed mergers may be necessary in order to
counteract the decision in the instant case."
It thus appears that the court in this case, by going beyond the issues
before it, has done a disservice to the cause of antitrust law enforcement.
Despite the court's apprehension, there is no reason to believe that the
Justice Department would exercise its power improperly (notwithstanding
its attempt in this case) because there are already sufficient safeguards built
into the AGFA. A more strict interpretation of "person under investigation"
would have solved this case equitably. The fact that every disputed demand
will be examined by a courtn should be a sufficient safeguard so that a court
need only pass upon the legality and sufficiency of the demand itself, rather
than undertake to narrow or construe the act beyond what is required by the
facts before it. A later decision by another court of appeals to remedy the
situation and set the ACPA back on an even keel would be most welcome.
LAWRENCE A. MAXHAM
Constitutional Law—Twenty-first Amendment—Price Regulation-
Extra-territorial Effects.—Joseph E. Seagram el Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter.'
—The New York Legislature has amended the state Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Laws2
 to insure that the wholesale liquor prices in New York are no
higher than the lowest wholesale prices charged by brand owners anywhere
else in the country. To this end, section 9 of the new law requires that a
30
 A less effective but nevertheless valuable alternative would be for the FTC to
make greater use of its rule-making power, 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1964),
to promulgate rules for the guidance of corporations and corporate 'counsel in evaluating
proposed acquisitions or mergers. Although not a method of enforcement, such rules would
provide a reliable guide and would be uniform—both distinct improvements over the
present situation. In Permanente Cement Co., Trade Reg. Rep. Tr. Binder, 1963-1965
F.T.C. Complaints, Orders, Stipulations 11 16885 (1964), the FTC indicated it intended
to hold public hearings and formulate rules for guidance purposes as authorized by its
Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 1.63 (Supp. 1964). However, since a set of such rules
must be confined to a single industry, it will be a long time before a significant portion
of American industry will have the use of them. See Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in
the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger Laws, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 385 (1964); Note, 40
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 771, 782 (1965).
31 The demand may be enforced in court by the Government, under 76 Stat. 551
(1962), 15 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1964); or it may be questioned in court by the demandee,
under 76 Stat. 551 (1962), 15 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1964).
1
 16 N.Y.2d 47, 209 N.E.2d 701, 262 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1965).
2
 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch. 531.
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